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NOTE
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UAW V. JOHNSON
CONTROLS, INC.: FETAL PROTECTION
AND TITLE VII REVISITED*
Since 1982, Johnson Controls, Inc., has, as a part of its safety programs,1
conducted a fetal protection policy "designed to prevent unborn children
and their mothers from suffering the adverse effects of lead exposure" 2 in its
battery production division. The policy "originate[d] from [Johnson Con-
trols'] longstanding corporate concern for the danger lead poses to the
health and welfare of their employees, their employees' families and the gen-
eral public." 3 It prohibits the hiring or transfer of "women with childbear-
ing capacity4 . . . into those jobs in which lead levels are defined as
excessive." 5
The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America and local UAW unions brought suit
alleging that the fetal protection policy violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
* [On March 20, 1991, while this Note was in press, the Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for trial. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., No. 89-1215 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1991), 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1715. This Note's conclusion-that
the bona fide occupational qualification applies to facially discriminatory fetal protection
policies-is consonant with the Court's decision. Ed.]
1. These safety programs included "a lead hygiene program, respirator program, biologi-
cal monitoring program, medical surveillance program and a program regulating the type, use
and disposal of employee work clothing and footwear to minimize lead exposure." Interna-
tional Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990). Johnson Controls also minimized the health effects of
lead exposure by using laminar flow pumps, central vacuum systems, and powered floor scrub-
bers "to keep the manufacturing area as clear of lead dust as possible." Id. To administer and
operate these programs, Johnson "has spent approximately $15 million on environmental engi-
neering controls at its battery division plants." Id.
2. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 874.
3. Id. at 875.
4. "The fetal protection policy defines women of childbearing capacity as: 'All women
except those whose inability to bear children is medically documented.' " Id. at 876 n.8 (quot-
ing the Johnson Controls, Inc. fetal protection policy).
5. Id. at 876. Excessive lead exposure levels are defined as: "[W]ork environments in
which any current employee has recorded a blood lead level exceeding 30 ug/dl during the
preceding year or in which the work site has yielded an air sample during the past year con-
taining a lead level in excess of 30 ug per cubic meter." Id.
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Act of 1964,6 as amended by the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act.7 Af-
ter a panel argument before the Seventh Circuit and a rehearing en banc, a
majority of the court,' in "likely the most important sex-discrimination case
in any court since 1964, when Congress enacted Title VII," 9 affirmed the
district court's ° grant of summary judgment"1 in favor of Johnson Controls.
In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, In,12 the Seventh Cir-
cuit "agree[d] with the Fourth Circuit,13 [the] Eleventh Circuit 14 and [the]
EEOC15 [(Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)] that the business
necessity defense can be appropriately applied to fetal protection policy cases
under Title VII."' 6 The court held that the employer met its burden of es-
tablishing a business necessity defense to the facially discriminatory policy
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1988).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
8. The en banc majority opinion resulted in a 7-4 decision in favor of granting summary
judgment to Johnson Controls, Inc. Judge Coffey wrote for the majority, joined by Chief
Judge Bauer and Judges Cummings, Wood, Ripple, Manion, and Kanne. Judges Cudahy,
Posner, Easterbrook, and Flaum dissented. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
9. Id. at 920 (Easterbrook & Flaum, JJ., dissenting).
Some employment discrimination experts say they consider the case "classically
cert-worthy," adding that if the UAW decides to appeal further, the U.S. Supreme
Court may be in a position to accept a fetal protection policy case for the first time, in
part, because of the unusual alignment in which the lower court's conservative key-
stone, Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and Richard A. Posner, and two prominent
liberals, Richard B. Cudahy and Joel M. Flaum, dissented.
Samborn, Worker Safety. 7th Circuit Bias Ruling Criticized, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 3, 30;
see also Swoboda, EEOC Limits Compliance With Fetal Case Ruling: Appeal is Carried to
Supreme Court, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1990, at A4, col. 1 ("If the [Supreme] [C]ourt agrees to
hear it [on the writ of certiorari filed on January 29, 1990], it could become a landmark deci-
sion in the area of employment discrimination against women.").
10. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988),
aff'd, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
11. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See generally
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (trial judge must determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial and submission to a jury by examining the evidence favoring
the nonmoving party); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (moving party is entitled
to summary judgment if the nonmoving party has failed to proffer sufficient evidence to satisfy
burden of proof on an essential element of the case).
12. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
13. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
14. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
15. The EEOC's position was set forth in Policy Guidance on Reproductive and Fetal
Hazards, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) T 5164, at 6449 (Oct. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Fetal
Hazards].
16. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 887.
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when the employer demonstrated significant evidence of a substantial risk of
harm to the unborn child, with this risk occurring only through exposure to
female employees, and the lack of adequate but less discriminatory alterna-
tives.1" The court's holding has been criticized as an anomaly in settled Title
VII law. 18
Section 717 of Title VII 9 prohibits employers from discriminating based
upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any personnel action.2°
Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, sex discrimination is defined to
include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, and related
medical conditions.2 ' Employers, therefore, who exclude fertile women
from a potentially hazardous workplace22 risk violating Title VII, as
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Arguably, Johnson Con-
trols' "exclusion of women who are pregnant or of childbearing capacity...
17. Id. at 883-87.
18. Judge Cudahy described the majority opinion as "result-oriented gimmickery," id. at
902 (dissenting), while Judge Posner called the Seventh Circuit's approach "legerdemain [that]
is as unnecessary as it is questionable." Id. at 903 (dissenting).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
20. Id.
21. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
22. These so-called fetal protection policies may operate solely on women who are already
pregnant, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1546 (1 th Cir. 1984); Zuniga
v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1982), or, more drastically, on all fertile
women with no demonstrated medical evidence of sterility. E.g., International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522
(1990); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). See generally M. ROTHSTEIN,
MEDICAL SCREENING: AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 47-55 (1989) [hereinafter
MEDICAL SCREENING] (discussing, inter alia, substances under review for reproductive health
effects, reported fetal developmental effects of exposure to reproductive hazards, and reproduc-
tive toxic effects). For scholarly discussion of fetal protection policies, see generally Becker,
From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219 (1986); Buss,
Getting Beyond Discrimination: A Regulatory Solution to the Problem of Fetal Hazards in the
Workplace, 95 YALE L.J. 577 (1986); Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Envi-
ronments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 66 IOWA L. REV. 63 (1980); Timko, Exploring the Limits of Legal Duty: A Union's
Responsibilities with Respect to Fetal Protection Policies, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 159 (1986);
Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with
Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981); Comment, Maternal
Liability: Courts Strive to Keep Doors Open to Fetal Protection-But Can They Succeed?, 20 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 747 (1987); Comment, Fetal Protection Programs Under Title VII-Re-
butting the Procreation Presumption, 46 U. PIrT. L. REV. 757 (1985).
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to protect the fetus from harm is a gender-based distinction and constitutes
[overt] sex discrimination under the [Pregnancy Discrimination] Act."
23
The statutory proscription against overt sex-based treatment in the work-
place has one exemption: When sex is "a bona fide occupational qualification
[(bfoq)] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise." 24 Interpreted narrowly, this justification for facial dis-
crimination is a difficult, though not impossible, standard to satisfy. 25
Unlike other burden of proof allocations under Title VII,26 including covert
forms of disparate treatment, the statutorily prescribed bfoq defense places
the ultimate burden of persuasion on the defendant-employer to justify a
facially discriminatory policy.
Conversely, facially neutral employment practices-that is, practices
which apply to all employees equally but operate to discriminate against a
protected class under Title VII-are treated under disparate impact theory27
and may be justified under the separate, less stringent, and more flexible
business necessity defense,28 as modified recently by Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio.29 Under disparate impact theory, the ultimate burden of persua-
sion remains at all times with the plaintiff3" because a facially neutral policy,
by definition, does not itself establish unlawful discrimination. Rather, a
facially neutral policy may be unlawful if it negatively and disparately affects
a protected group.
In litigation involving facially discriminatory fetal protection policies, the
issue is not whether women are using Title VII "to enforce a right to endan-
ger knowingly a helpless fetus with blood lead poisoning and consequent
23. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus.- The Reconciliation of Fetal Protec-
tion with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 679 (1981); see
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983) (The PDA
"has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's preg-
nancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989), the Court summarized the import and clear meaning of this provision:
Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into
account in making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a [bfoq] ...
The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other circum-
stances, a person's gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her.
Id. at 1786 (citation omitted).
25. See infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 44-50, 71-86 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 69-88 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
30. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
997 (1988).
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mental and physical impairment."'', Rather, the issue is whether the em-
ployer has satisfied its legitimate, statutory bfoq burden of proof in inten-
tionally excluding qualified women because of their sex, fertility, or
pregnancy.
The troubling aspect of Johnson Controls is that the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the grant of summary judgment based upon the business necessity
defense, reserved only for disparate impact cases. Yet, the Johnson Controls
policy32 is clearly facially discriminatory. By applying the disparate impact
standard to a facially discriminatory policy, the Seventh Circuit abrogated
the employer's statutorily prescribed bfoq burden of proof. This decision
may have far reaching effects on the job opportunities of women,3" should
other areas of industry follow the Johnson Controls policy.3 4
31. Fein, Their Noble Cause Gone Mad, Wash. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, Fl, col. 4, at F4, col.
1.
32. The fetal protection policy was based upon the medically documented and potentially
harmful effects of lead exposure to a fertile or pregnant woman and her unborn fetus. See
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 879-83 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990). As a result of these findings, " '[a]ll women except
those whose inability to bear children [was] medically documented'" were excluded from ar-
eas with lead exposure levels considered excessive by the company. Id. at 876 n.8 (quoting the
Johnson Controls, Inc. fetal protection policy).
33. "The Bureau of National Affairs estimates 15 million to 20 million jobs implicate fetal
risks due to chemical exposure, and additional occupations, such as X-ray technician, that
expose workers to radiation similarly endanger the health of embryos." Fein, supra note 31,
at Fl, col. 4; see also Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 914 (Easterbrook & Flaum, JJ., dissenting)
("[R]igorous implementation of fetal protection policies could close more than 20 million jobs
to women." (footnote omitted)). But see id. at 901 n.43 ("This speculative statement, [based
upon a Bureau of National Affairs Special Report, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT (1987)],
taken at its face value, merely suggests a possibility of reproductive injury [to 15-20 million
workers] from unidentified and undefined toxic substances." (emphasis supplied)). An earlier
estimate in 1979 concluded that at least 100,000 jobs were closed to women and that the trend
was on the rise. Williams, supra note 23, at 647 n.30 & n.29 (referring to Wash. Post, Nov. 3,
1979, at A6, col. 5; Wash. Star, May 30, 1979, at A12, col. 1).
34. The outcome of the case could affect a wide variety of industries in which factory
workers may be exposed to poisons that could cause physical or mental deformity or
deficiency in future children born to those workers. Although the Johnson Controls
case involves only lead poisoning, the legal principles that emerge may go well
beyond.
New Haven Reg., Feb. 18, 1990, at A16, col. 1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission believes that
there are potentially millions of jobs at issue .... By 1990, 58 percent of all women
in the United States will be employed. The new "high tech" industries may present
heretofore unsuspected risks. Video display workers and semiconductor manufactur-
ers, in particular, are suspected of being at risk from exposure to reproductive
hazards.
Fetal Hazards, supra note 15, at 6450 n.2 (citations omitted). "Millions of woman [sic] of
childbearing age who use computers, for example, could be affected because of claims by some
safety experts that low-level radiation from video display terminals may have harmful effects
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This Note will critically examine the result of Johnson Controls in the
context of traditional Title VII disparate treatment and disparate impact
analyses. The Note will compare the Seventh Circuit's approach to fetal
protection policies in Johnson Controls with similar decisions by the Fourth
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the EEOC. Because of these consistent,
but statutorily inappropriate, applications of the business necessity defense
(in a facially discriminatory posture), this Note supplies an argument for
reinterpretation of fetal protection in the Title VII framework. Further, this
Note will argue that since the bfoq defense is the only statutory exception to
facial discrimination, the business necessity defense should not be applied to
sex-based fetal protection policies. This Note will conclude that not all fetal
protection policies are per se violative of Title VII; rather, only those facially
discriminatory policies that fail to satisfy the stringent statutory require-
ments of the bfoq should be declared unlawful.
I. TRADITIONAL TITLE VII ANALYSES-DISPARATE TREATMENT AND
DISPARATE IMPACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's . . .sex.""5 Through Title VII and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Congress has attempted to remove all "arti-
ficial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissi-
ble classification." 36 The overriding goal of Title VII is to provide equality
in employment opportunities and practices, prohibiting "not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."3 7 To this end, Title VII requires courts to "focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes"3 and award equitable relief as
on pregnant women's fetuses." Swoboda, EEOC Limits Compliance With Fetal Case Ruling:
Appeal is Carried to Supreme Court, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1990, at A4, col. 1; see also Johnson
Controls, 886 F.2d at 914 n.7 (Easterbrook & Flaum, iJ., dissenting) (Because "many addi-
tional women are affected by restrictions placed on other jobs, such as the x-ray technician jobs
that exposed embryos to radiation[, c]oncern about emissions from computers and their termi-
nals has led to proposals that could restrict access even to traditional office jobs."); Note, Pink
Collar Blues.: Potential Hazards of Video Display Terminal Radiation, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 139,
151-57 (1983) (discussing the differential impact on, and disparate treatment of, men and wo-
men exposed to video display terminal radiation).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
36. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971); accord McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973).
37. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; accord Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982).
38. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
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deemed appropriate.39
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended the definition section of Title
VII to provide that discrimination on the basis of sex included discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.'
Although neither the Act nor its legislative history directly addressed the
problem of fetal protection policies, the "bill ma[de] clear that its protection
extends to the whole range of matters concerning the child-bearing pro-
cess." In doing so, the House Report stated unequivocally:
Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women are margi-
nal workers. Until a woman passes the child-bearing age, she is
viewed by employers as potentially pregnant. Therefore, the elimi-
nation of discrimination based on pregnancy in these employment
practices in addition to disability and medical benefits will go a
long way toward providing equal employment opportunities for
women ....42
In light of this support for the otherwise plain text of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, Johnson Controls' sweeping exclusion of all women, except
those whose infertility is medically documented, appears violative of Title
VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.43
A. Disparate Treatment and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
The term "disparate treatment" encompasses both facially discriminatory
policies and adverse employment actions caused, directly or indirectly, by
discriminatory conduct. Without direct evidence of discriminatory conduct
or evidence of a facially discriminatory policy, however, a plaintiff's Title
VII disparate treatment allegations are subjected to a rigorous burden shift-
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Traditional Title VII remedies allow for "reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay." Id. See generally Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (addressing the central remedial statutory purposes of Title
VII).
40. Pub. L. No. 99-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
41. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4753.
42. Id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4754-55 (emphasis
supplied).
43. Where the justification for the exclusion [of women] is possible genetic harm, the
line drawn treats men and women differently with respect to the carrying of genetic
material, a characteristic shared by both sexes. A line thus drawn has always been
viewed as facial gender-based discrimination. When the justification for the exclu-
sion is the protection of the fetus from in utero exposure to workplace hazards-a
characteristic unique to women-the Pregnancy Discrimination Act[. renders the
employer's action facial sex discrimination as well.
Williams, supra note 23, at 679 (footnotes omitted).
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ing analysis." This burden shifting approach is "merely a sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the
critical question of discrimination."45
For decisions affecting the work environment, courts preserve Title VII's
recognition of, and deference to, the employer's legitimate business judg-
ment.46 As such, courts do not require the defendant-employer, faced with
allegations of discrimination, to meet strictly each burden of production in
accordance with the judicially crafted factors set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green47 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 8
44. Under this approach, the plaintiff must suffer an adverse employment action under
circumstances indicating that a prohibited criterion influenced the employer's decision. To
establish an inference of discrimination, the record must contain direct evidence of discrimina-
tion, or circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. See, e.g., McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). An inference of discrimination creates a
rebuttable "presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the [plaintiff]."
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
In order to rebut the presumption of discrimination, "the [employer] must clearly set forth,
through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's [adverse em-
ployment action]." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. In other words, the employer must produce
"'evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason.'" United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
714 (1983) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). Furthermore, the proffered explanation must
be reasonably specific, sufficient to justify a judgment for the employer, and framed with "suffi-
cient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
Once the employer has investigated the allegations and/or offered an explanation for the
challenged action, "the McDonnell-Burdine presumption drops from the case and the factual
inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (citations and quota-
tions omitted). The central focus, upon reviewing the proffered explanation in light of the
entire record, is whether the employer treated the plaintiff less favorably than others because of
the plaintiff's protected status. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)
(quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
Hence, after the defendant has sustained his burden of production in the face of an inference of
discrimination, the fact-finder's task is to "decide which party's explanation of the employer's
motivation it believes." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
In order to sustain a claim of discrimination, the record must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the employer's reason for the personnel action, if any, was motivated by a
prohibited criterion. The plaintiff "may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
Consequently, while the burden of setting forth a credible reason for the action, in order to
rebut the presumption of discrimination, rests with the employer, "[tihe ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id. at 253.
45. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
46. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1786 (1989) ("The statute's
maintenance of employer prerogatives is evident from the statute itself and from its history,
both in Congress and in this Court.").
47. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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These elements, useful in determining the issue of discrimination, were
"never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic." 4 9 However, when
the employer (through its policy) decides explicitly to limit the employment
opportunities of a class, based solely upon the characteristics of that class,
the critical question of discrimination is proven, without a judicial analysis,
and Congress has statutorily limited the circumstances in which an employer
may implement such a policy.50 Hence, the flexible burden-shifting ap-
proach (determining the question of discrimination) is irrelevant to facially
discriminatory policies; the court must proceed only to determine if the pro-
scribed practice can nonetheless be justified within the bfoq exemption.
Although Title VII prohibits discrimination in all employment practices,
the bfoq exception to this prohibition provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of ... sex ... in
those certain instances where.., sex.., is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary, to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise . . .
Courts narrowly interpret this exception to the rule of non-discrimination5 2
and justify its use only in rare circumstances.5 3 Generally, the bfoq defense,
and thus, "discrimination based on sex[,] is [permissible] only when the es-
sence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members
of one sex exclusively. ' , 54 Accordingly, mere administrative convenience is
insufficient to satisfy the bfoq exception. 5
Once a defendant invokes the bfoq defense, the judicial analysis begins,
48. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
49. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
50. Title VII forbids an employer deliberately to exclude a worker from a particular
job because of the worker's sex [or pregnancy] unless sex[/pregnancy] is a "bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that par-
ticular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l).... It is written narrowly
and has been read narrowly .... A narrow reading is, nevertheless, inevitable [be-
cause a] broad reading would gut the statute.
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 902-03 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
52. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d
1364, 1370 (1lth Cir. 1982); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th
Cir. 1969); Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 639 F. Supp. 271, 277 (E.D.
Wis. 1986), aff'd, 838 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 1523, 1527 (7th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133 (1989); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1989).
53. Manley v. Mobile County, 441 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Torres, 639 F.
Supp. at 278; see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334-37.
54. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (emphasis in
original), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
55. Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1087 (8th Cir.) ("Title VII
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and the lawfulness of the facially discriminatory policy remains at issue. In
order to prevail on a statutory bfoq defense, the employer-defendant must
ultimately prove:
56
(1) that the essence of the activity in question would be under-
mined by the employment of one sex.., in the positions in dispute;
(2) that there is reasonable cause to believe[, that is-a factual basis
for believing,] that all, or substantially all, members of one sex...
would be unable to perform the job duties in question safely and
efficiently; 5"
(3) that failure to allow members of one sex ... to work the posi-
tions in question was based on actual sexual characteristics rather
than stereotyped assumptions;58 and
(4) that there were no less restrictive alternatives which could have
been utilized to avoid the [classification] of the positions in
question.5 9
Whether the bfoq applies in a given situation is controlled by the statutory
language,' and the bfoq will apply whenever an employer directly fails or
refuses to hire an individual because of that individual's sex or uses overt
discrimination to protect a public or private interest. 61 The courts normally
employ a strict balancing test and may require proof that an employer could
requires administrative necessity, not merely administrative inconvenience, to satisfy the bfoq
exception." (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
56. Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 639 F. Supp. 271, 278 (E.D. Wis.
1986) (citing Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,482
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1982)), aff'd, 838 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d
1523, 1527 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133 (1989).
57. Accord Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
58. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
1978) (employment decisions may not be based on myths or stereotypical assumptions of male
or female characteristics); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.
1971) (congressional purpose of Title VII is the elimination of "subjective assumptions and
traditional stereotyped conceptions regarding the physical ability of women to do particular
work"); Weeks, 408 F.2d at 236 ("Title VII rejects ... romantic paternalism as unduly Victo-
rian and instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take on
unromantic tasks."); Woody v. City of W. Miami, 477 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(Title VII prohibits "stereotypical culturally-based concepts" of the ability to perform certain
tasks because of sex).
59. Torres, 639 F. Supp. at 279 ("The Court finds as a matter of law that before an em-
ployer defendant can overcome the strong policy against sex discrimination and avail itself of
the narrow exception of a bfoq, it must establish that no administrative alternatives are avail-
able or feasible that can avoid overt sex discrimination.").
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) (defining unlawful employer practices); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988) (providing for bona fide occupational qualification exemption).
61. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422-23 (1985) (bfoq ap-
plied to age restrictions on flight engineers); Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social
Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1526-28 (7th Cir. 1988) (bfoq applied to exclusion of male guards from
female prison because of privacy concerns), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133 (1989).
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not reasonably develop alternative operating procedures to avoid conflicts
between private interests and equal employment opportunity.6 2 Ultimately,
the employer-defendant must bear the entire burden of proving that the dis-
tinction is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular"
organization. Otherwise, the employment policy based upon the proscribed
distinction violates Title VII.
In particular, the essential job requirements and/or the health or safety of
third persons have been found reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business, and therefore have been dispositive in determining
the sufficiency of the employer's bfoq defense.63 This reasoning suggests that
the defense, while requiring a narrow interpretation, is not insurmountable.
62. See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 54-55 (7th Cir. 1982) (adjustment of facility
and work assignments of male guards in female prisons protects inmate privacy), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 907 (1983); Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1982) (same);
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (8th Cir.) (possible to
develop narrowly drawn job classifications for correctional officers to protect inmate privacy),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F.
Supp. 769, 779 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (adjustment of facility and work assignments of male guards
in female prison protects inmate privacy), aff'd mem., 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985); Hudson v.
Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (D. Md. 1980) (selective work assignments protect both
inmate privacy and female equal employment opportunities); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del.,
Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Del. 1978) (adjustment of facility and male intern work
assignments protects privacy), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3rd Cir. 1979); Forts v. Ward, 471
F. Supp. 1095, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (adjustment of facility and work assignments of male
guards in female prisons protects inmate privacy), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.
1980); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (held Bureau of Prisons
could make selective work assignments to protect inmate privacy without discriminating
against women). Contra Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530 (consumer preference and privacy not the
issue when addressing the state's responsibility to implement statutory goal of rehabilitation by
excluding male guards from female correctional institution).
63. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-37 (1977) (male-only certification
for correctional guards in maximum security prison, in highly unusual and dangerous circum-
stances, constitutes a bfoq where female guards would threaten prison security); Levin v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997-99 (5th Cir. 1984) (nonpregnancy constitutes bfoq when
possible pregnancy conditions would threaten passenger safety); Condit v. United Air Lines;
Inc., 558 F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934
(1978); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1087 (8th Cir.) (a classifica-
tion narrowly drawn involving duties necessary to inmate privacy may satisfy a bfoq), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236-38 (5th
Cir. 1976) (age will constitute bfoq for bus driver when age related conditions might threaten
passenger safety); Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 585 F. Supp. 435, 442-43 (N.D. Il1. 1984)
(preserving Jesuit presence on a Catholic university faculty deemed to be bfoq and reasonably
necessary to normal operation of university), aff'd, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986); Coble v.
Texas Dep't of Corrections, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 140, 148 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (same
sex requirement for employees performing, inter alia, strip searches on a random, nonemer-
gency basis is justifiable bfoq and does not violate Title VII); Backus v. Baptist Medical Center;
510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193-97 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (female qualification permitted for nurse in labor
and delivery areas of hospital), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Ma-
sonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1351-54 (D. Del. 1978) (bfoq established in
1991]
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However, the Fourth Circuit, in Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 6 held
that nonpregnancy was not a bfoq for a stewardess position. Despite argu-
ments that a pregnant stewardess posed dangers to herself and her fetus, the
court held that the airline's concern for the health of the worker and the
fetus did not relate to the essence of its business.65 Similarly, the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, in In re National Airlines, Inc. ,66
ruled that nonpregnancy was not a bfoq for a stewardess position, despite
concerns for the safety of passengers,67 and specifically found that "the ques-
tion of harm to the fetus is basically a decision to be made not by this court,
but by the mother of the fetus.",
68
B. Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense
The business necessity defense, unlike the bfoq, has no statutory basis
within Title VII. The defense was judicially manufactured by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,69 and operates, if
proven, to shield an employer from claims that facially neutral employment
practices have a discriminatory impact on protected groups. Examples of
facially neutral policies, normally involving standardized tests or job require-
ments, are numerous.7 °
nursing home based upon the privacy interests and preferences of guests), aff'd mem., 591
F.2d 1334 (3rd Cir. 1979).
64. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
65. Burwell, 633 F.2d at 366 ("The medical experts and sources.., point to the virtual
unanimous conclusion that a pregnant flight attendant can adequately perform routine and
emergency duties through the thirteenth week of pregnancy."). A disparate impact analysis
was adopted to decide that mandatory pregnancy leave policies for stewardesses provided a
legitimate business necessity. Id. at 373. The court did, however, dismiss the fetal safety argu-
ment, favoring instead the passenger safety rationale:
Eastern's contention that an element of business necessity is its consideration for
the safety of the pregnant flight attendant and her unborn child is not persuasive....
Focusing [on] all the evidence at trial . . . demonstrates that Eastern's policy as it
relates to pregnancy after the thirteenth week results from the legitimate business
necessity of safely transporting passengers.
Id. at 371 (footnote omitted).
66. 434 F. Supp. 249, 259 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1990). But see
Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (nonpregnancy is
a bfoq when flight attendants, incapacitated by pregnancy-related conditions, might threaten
passenger and airline operation safety), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
67. As a result, flight attendants were permitted to fly during the first trimester because
pregnancy would not interfere with the performance of their safety duties. In addition, the
district court noted that it did "not consider the effect on the fetus as material to the issues of
[the] BFOQ." In re National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. at 261 n.15.
68. Id. at 259.
69. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
70. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination); New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (employer prohibition against employee metha-
1991] International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 379
Under traditional disparate impact theory, the plaintiff must initially show
that the disputed facially neutral policy or practice actually operates to affect
adversely the protected group. "The evidence in these 'disparate impact'
cases usually focuses on statistical disparities [between employment of pro-
tected and unprotected groups], rather than specific incidents, and on com-
peting explanations for those disparities."
7 1
After the plaintiff produces evidence of disparate impact, the defendant
may proffer a business necessity defense. The business necessity defense im-
poses a limited burden of production on the defendant to show that the pol-
icy or practice has "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question"72 and is "necessary to safe and efficient job performance.
73
Although initially the bfoq (reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that business) and the business necessity defense (necessary to safe and
efficient job performance) appear similar, the posture of the business neces-
sity defense and its utility has historically remained distinct in different Title
VII circumstances. 71 Significantly, the burden of persuasion in business ne-
cessity defense cases has recently been clarified; unlike bfoq defense cases, it
remains at all times with the plaintiff.
75
done users); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (verbal proficiency examination); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (aptitude tests); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (written standardized test).
71. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
72. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
73. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977); accord Blake v. City of Los
Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980).
74. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 328-34 (rejecting characterization of height and weight re-
quirements as facially neutral, consequently applying bfoq, not business necessity); Burwell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("In sex discrimination
cases .... clear disparate impact discrimination will be tested by business necessity and clear
disparate treatment discrimination will be tested by a BFOQ defense." (citation omitted)), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1980) (The "BFOQ
is a warrant for affirmative, deliberate discrimination while a BND [Business Necessity De-
fense] is a defense to the prima facie case made when an apparently neutral employment prac-
tice is shown to have discriminatory effect[s]." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.8 (8th Cir.) (overt
discriminatory policy violates Title VII unless bfoq, while facially neutral practice, discrimina-
tory in operation, violates Title VII unless justified as business necessity), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
966 (1980); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 674 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)
(The bona fide occupational qualification "defense is applicable to employment practices that
purposefully discriminate on the basis of sex while the Business Necessity defense is appropri-
ately raised where facially neutral employment practices run afoul of Title VII only because of
their disparate impact." (footnote and citation omitted)).
75. See infra note 83. Unlike disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff is not required to
prove discriminatory intent in disparate impact cases. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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This essential distinction between the two defenses emerged from two
landmark Supreme Court decisions: Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
76
and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.7 To establish a disparate impact
case and thereby invite the business necessity defense, a plaintiff must meet
three evidentiary burdens. First, the plaintiff must present statistical evi-
dence demonstrating a disparity in the employer's workforce.78 Second, the
plaintiff must identify a specific employment policy or practice responsible
for the disparity. 79 Third, "causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff
must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the
practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promo-
tions because of their membership in a protected group."80 After Watson
and Wards Cove, statistical disparities "alone[, without identification of the
source-policy and proof of causation,] will not suffice to make out a prima
facie case of disparate impact."'"
If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the defendant-employer must
rebut the inference of disparate impact by demonstrating a business neces-
sity: that the "challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer." 2 This burden on the defendant, how-
76. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
77. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
78. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 ("[T]he plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie case
goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer's
workforce."). For such evidence to be helpful, the statistics "must be sufficiently substantial
that they raise ... an inference of causation." Id. at 995.
79. Id. at 994 ("[T]he plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating and identifying the
specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical dispari-
ties." (citation omitted)); Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124 ("As a general matter, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that
has created the disparate impact under attack.").
80. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; see also Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
81. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125 (emphasis in original). This is because "[fit would be
equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or discover and explain, the myr-
iad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work
forces." Watson, 487 U.S. at 992; accord Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
82. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26 (citations omitted).
The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's justification for
his use of the challenged practice. A mere insubstantial justification in this regard
will not suffice, because such a low standard of review would permit discrimination
to be practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices.
At the same time, though, there is no requirement that the challenged practice be
"essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's business for it to pass muster: this
degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to meet, and
would result in a host of evils ....
Id. at 2126 (citations omitted).
Prior to Watson and Wards Cove, the defendant's burden was as follows:
[T]he business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any disparate im-
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ever, in no way relieves the plaintiff of his ultimate burden of persuasion on
the issue of discrimination.83
If the plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate impact is rebutted by evi-
dence of a business necessity, the plaintiff may succeed only by suggesting
other employment practices or policies that would serve the employer's legit-
imate employment goals without the disparate impact.8 4 In evaluating the
plaintiff's proffered alternatives, however, courts recognize that the judiciary
is " generally less competent than employers to restructure business prac-
tices' "" and, therefore, "should proceed with care before mandating that an
employer must adopt a plaintiff's alternate selection or hiring practice in
response to a Title VII suit."
86
Despite the consistently separate theoretical and practical application of
the bona fide occupational qualification/disparate treatment model and the
business necessity/disparate impact model,'8  courts have had difficulty de-
ciding which defense provides the requisite quantum of proof to rebut ade-
quately an overt, discriminatory fetal protection policy.88
pact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is
alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or
practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accom-
plish it equally well with a lesser [disparate] impact.
Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 928 (1980).
83. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 997) ("The ultimate
burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific
employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times." (emphasis in Wards Cove)).
84. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
[W]hen a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and when the
defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that its employment practices
are based on legitimate business reasons, the plaintiff must "show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable . . . effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship."
Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). However, it must be
remembered that "any alternative practiced which [plaintiff] offer[s] lip in this respect must be
equally effective as [the employer's] chosen hiring procedures in achieving [the employer's]
legitimate employment goals." Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127. Compare supra note 82 and
accompanying text (pre-Wards Cove standard for business necessity).
85. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 578 (1978)).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 74.
88. This difficulty stems from confusing the legal application of the bfoq and the business
necessity defense to the specific facts of a case. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
458 F. Supp. 474, 495 n.Il (E.D. Va. 1978) ("[I]t is not entirely clear whether [the policy]
should be tested under the 'business necessity' test, the bfoq test, or both."), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965
(1981). In addition, evidentiary problems abound because of the nature and uncertainty of
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II. TITLE VII AND FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES: BFOQ OR BUSINESS
NECESSITY?
The first major case addressing a fetal protection policy and its proper
conceptual framework for judicial analysis was Wright v. Olin Corp.89 The
Olin Corporation created a female employment and fetal vulnerability pro-
gram that encompassed three job classifications for women working in its
chemical plant: restricted, 90 controlled, 91 and unrestricted.92 The Fourth
Circuit, after struggling with the application of the bfoq exemption or the
business necessity defense, held that Olin's facially discriminatory policy
could be defended with proof of a business necessity, thereby rejecting the
plaintiff's contention that an overt, discriminatory policy forces an employer
to defend under the bfoq defense.
Although "the evidence of the existence and operation of the fetal vulner-
ability program established as a matter of law a prima facie case of Title VII
violation," 93 the Olin court reasoned that "[w]hile the loose equation--overt
discrimination/only b.f.o.q. defense-is therefore properly descriptive of a
paradigmatic litigation pattern, it is not an accurate statement of any inher-
ent constraints in Title VII doctrine."94 In other words, the Fourth Circuit
found the bfoq to be a defense "that obviously cannot be established," 95 and
declared that the "defendant [was] entitled to have considered-though not
necessarily to have accepted-the defense actually advanced under the wider
scope of the business necessity theory." 96
scientific evidence and the different effects of discrete occupational agents on male and female
reproduction. Employers, themselves, confront two problems in controlling the effects of re-
productive hazards:
First, with regard to at least some agents, the developing embryo and fetus may suffer
severe effects at exposure levels that have no effect on the mother (or father). These
levels may be so low as to render their elimination technologically and economically
infeasible. Second, the nature and severity of developmental defects depends [sic] on
the degree of exposure and the time of exposure.
MEDICAL SCREENING, supra note 22, at 48 (footnote omitted).
89. 697 F.2d 1172, 1182-92 (4th Cir. 1982).
90. "Restricted jobs are those which may require contact with and exposure to known or
suspected abortifacient or teratogenic agents. Fertile women [ages 5 to 63] are excluded from
such jobs." Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182 (quotation marks omitted).
91. "Controlled jobs may require very limited contact with the harmful chemicals. Preg-
nant women may work at such jobs only after individual case-by-case evaluations. Non-preg-
nant women may work in controlled jobs after signing a form stating that they recognize that
the job presents some risk, although slight." Id. (quotation marks and footnote omitted).
92. "Unrestricted jobs are those which do not present a hazard to the pregnant female or
the fetus. They are open to all women." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 1187 (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 1186 n.21.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp. ,9 the Eleventh Circuit consulted the
decision in Olin to find that adverse employment actions taken by the em-
ployer in the fetal protection area could be justified by the business necessity
defense. 98 Consistent with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Olin, though dis-
agreeing with that court's reasoning, 99 the Eleventh Circuit opined that a
fetal protection policy that applied solely to one sex would violate Title VII
unless: "(1) [the employer proves] that a substantial risk of harm exists; and
(2) that the risk is borne only by members of one sex; and (3) the employee
fails to show that there are acceptable alternative policies that would have a
lesser impact on the affected sex. '' o
The Hayes court reasoned that a policy meeting these criteria, 101 regard-
less of its facially discriminatory operation and effect, "is neutral in the sense
that it effectively and equally protects the offspring of all employees."' 0 2 In
97. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
98. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552. The defendant-hospital dismissed a pregnant woman out of
concern for fetal exposure to X-rays. The Hayes court permitted the application of the busi-
ness necessity defense to this facially discriminatory action. However, the court held that
because the hospital failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination and failed to consider
less discriminatory alternatives to firing the plaintiff, it violated the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978. Id. at 1554.
99. We believe it unnecessary to place the fetus into a legal classification developed
for an entirely different aspect of the law, and therefore decline to endorse Olin's
approach of equating a fetus with a business invitee or licensee. Instead, we simply
recognize fetal protection as a legitimate area of employer concern to which the busi-
ness necessity defense extends.
Id. at 1552 n.14.
100. Id. at 1554.
101. The Eleventh Circuit, in deciding which defense was appropriate in fetal protection
cases, created a rebuttable presumption that fetal protection policies were facially discrimina-
tory. Moreover, when this presumption was not rebutted by a showing that the policy "effec-
tively and equally protect[ed] the offspring of all employees," id. at 1548, the only defense
available for the facially discriminatory policy would be the bfoq. Id. at 1548-49. Once ap-
plied, the sufficiency of the bfoq defense in these cases was questioned in the following terms:
"[W]hen a policy designed to protect employee offspring from workplace hazards proves
facially discriminatory, there is, in effect, no defense, unless the employer shows a direct rela-
tionship between the policy and the actual ability of a pregnant or fertile female to perform her
job." Id. at 1549.
102. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984). In order to
refute this judicial conclusion, the plaintiff is permitted to show, and has the burden to prove,
that "there are acceptable alternative policies that would better accomplish the purposes of
promoting fetal health, or that would accomplish the purpose with a less adverse impact on
one sex." Id. at 1553 (citing Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1982)).
The conclusion that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is "neutral," in any sense of
the word, was rejected by Congress with the 1978 enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA). See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-79
(1983) (explaining that the PDA was enacted both to prevent pregnancy discrimination from
being treated as a neutral distinction for Title VII purposes and specifically to preclude the
result reached in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that the exclu-
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so doing, the court determined that the appropriate way to approach a fetal
protection case may depend on the type of defense the employer can muster,
not on the overt, discriminatory nature of the employment practice.
0 3
In designating fetal protection a "legitimate area of employer concern""'
and by abandoning the bfoq and business necessity focus on business charac-
teristics and job performance, the Hayes-Olin decisions (i) may have effec-
tively reinforced the notion that employers can legitimately exclude women
(without proving the bfoq) based upon benevolent societal values, and (ii), in
sion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the company disability plan did not constitute sex
discrimination). See generally Note, California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra: State
Guarantee of Pregnancy Disability Leave Confronts Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 327 (1986) (discussing congressional rejection of a neutral
characterization for pregnancy discrimination in the context of state anti-discrimination
legislation).
103. In Hayes, the court stated: "Although we tend to agree that this is a facial discrimina-
tion case, to ensure complete fairness to the [employer], we will also analyze this case under
the disparate impact/business necessity theory." Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548. Similarly, the Olin
court opined:
[W]here the defendant-employer has not attempted to present a classic b.f.o.q. de-
fense, it may not properly be forced to do so. We therefore reject claimant's sugges-
tion that because the claim of violation here is arguably one of 'overt' discrimination,
the employer is confined to a b.f.o.q defense that obviously cannot be established and
indeed is not advanced.
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1186 n.21 (4th Cir. 1982).
With these pronouncements, the Hayes-Olin decisions abandoned the statutorily prescribed
bfoq defense because it would be unfair, or inopportune for the defendant. These statutory
semantics, underlying much of the legal reasoning employed in the fetal protection area, bring
to mind the following oft-quoted conversation between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many differ-
ent things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS: AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 94 (Ran-
dom House spec. ed. 1946) (emphasis in original).
104. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552 n.14. The Olin court similarly held:
We do not think that a general basis for the "business necessity" asserted here need
be sought in other considerations than the general societal interest-reflected in
many national laws imposing legal obligations upon business enterprises-in having
those enterprises operated in ways protective of the health of workers and their fami-
lies, consumers, and environmental neighbors. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (Con-
sumer Product Safety Act); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (Federal Food, Drug'and Cosmetic
Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (Occupational Safety and Health Act).
697 F.2d at 1190 n.26. The Olin court analogized the concern for the health of the unborn
with the concern for the safety of business invitees and licensees: "[W]e cannot believe that
Congress meant by Title VII absolutely to deprive employers of the right to provide any pro-
tection for licensees and invitees legitimately and necessarily upon their premises by any policy
having a disparate impact upon certain workers." Id. at 1189 (emphasis supplied) (citation
omitted).
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so doing, may have opened a Pandora's box.1
0 5
In both Olin and Hayes, decided before Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust " and Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio,1 0 7 the employer retained the
ultimate burden of proof'08 on two issues: the substantial risk of harm re-
quirement and the risk of fetal exposure through the single-sex-excluded re-
quirement.1 "9 By mistakenly interpreting the business necessity defense in
105. As one dissenting opinion in Johnson Controls noted:
How does the risk attributable to lead compare, say, to the risk to the next generation
created by driving a taxi? A female bus or taxi driver is exposed to noxious fumes
and the risk of accidents, all hazardous to a child she carries. Would it follow that
taxi and bus companies can decline to hire women?
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 917 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Easterbrook & Flaum, JJ., dissenting), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
Additionally, one commentator has posed the following questions:
Is it acceptable for an employer to single out a group of employees believed to be
hypersusceptible, and remove those workers from the workplace, in order to protect
their health, the health of others, and-in economic terms-the health of the busi-
ness? Stated otherwise, can a company manipulate the composition of its workforce
in order to minimize the impact of toxic substance exposure on employee health?
Can an employer decide, for example, that it will not hire fertile women, or men with
high blood pressure, or people younger than forty, in order to limit its possible liabil-
ity for later illness?
Bor, Fetal Protection Policies and Title VII, 2 LAB. LAW. 683, 683 (1986).
The Johnson Controls policy explicitly embodied these concerns. Denise Zutz, spokeswo-
man for Johnson Controls, stated that there was "clearly a moral dimension" to the company's
fetal protection policy. New Haven Reg., Feb. 18, 1990, at A16, col. 1. A company lawyer is
quoted as stating that Johnson Controls felt " 'morally required to protect children from their
parents' mistakes.'" Id. Joan E. Bertin, associate director of the women's rights project of the
American Civil Liberties Union, disagreed: "Obviously we're opposed to these policies and this
approach to health protection, in part, because we don't think it offers health protection. It's
coercive to women workers who are dependant on their employment for their well-being and
the well-being of their families." Samborn, Worker Safety: 7th Circuit Bias Ruling Criticized,
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 30, col. 1.
106. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
107. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
108. To sustain this burden, the defendant-employer must produce independent and objec-
tive scientific evidence which is "supported by the opinion evidence of qualified experts in the
relevant scientific fields." Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982); Hayes v.
Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (1 1th Cir. 1984). In addition,
it is not necessary to prove the existence of a general consensus on the points within
the qualified scientific community. It suffices to show that within that community
there is so considerable a body of opinion that significant risk exists, and ... that an
informed employer could not responsibly fail to act on the assumption that this opin-
ion might be an accurate one.
Olin, 697 F.2d at 1191 (citation omitted); Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548. Finally, "[t]his burden
may not be carried by proof alone that the employer subjectively and in good faith believed its
program to be necessary and effective for the purpose [of workplace safety]." Olin, 697 F.2d at
1190; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
109. The burden of persuasion is upon the employer to prove that significant risks of
harm to the unborn children of women workers from their exposure during preg-
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this way, as Watson and Wards Cove point out,1"' and by interpreting the
bfoq and business necessity defenses similarly,"' the Olin-Hayes courts may
have obscured the statutory imperative to apply the bfoq defense to a facially
discriminatory policy. Watson and Wards Cove, however, emphatically left
the ultimate burden of persuasion with the plaintiff when litigating a facially
neutral policy. Hence, after Watson and Wards Cove, there can be no inter-
changeability between the bfoq and the business necessity defenses. Despite
the unambiguous distinction drawn in Watson and Wards Cove, the court in
Johnson Controls (like Hayes and Olin) incorrectly applied the business neces-
sity defense to a facially discriminatory policy, but, unlike Olin and Hayes,
correctly interpreted the defense as placing the ultimate burden of proof on
the plaintiff.
Consequently, the defendant-employer in Johnson Controls escaped even
nancy to toxic hazards in the workplace make necessary, for the safety of the unborn
children, that fertile women workers, though not men workers, be appropriately re-
stricted from exposure to those hazards and that its program of restriction is effective
for th[at] purpose.
Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted). In addition, "[s]howing that the
risk sought to be avoided is, on the best available scientific data, substantially confined to the
exposure of women workers is critical to showing the program's effectiveness." Id. at 1190
n.27.
Similarly, Hayes stated:
[T]he employer must show (1) that there is a substantial risk of harm to the fetus or
potential offspring of women employees from the women's exposure, either during
pregnancy or while fertile, to toxic hazards in the workplace, and (2) that the hazard
applies to fertile or pregnant women, but not to men.
726 F.2d at 1548 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
110. We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting [that
the employer retains a burden of proof in disparate impact cases]. But to the extent
that those cases speak of an employers' "burden of proof" with respect to a legiti-
mate business justification defense, they should have been understood to mean an
employer's production-but not persuasion-burden. The persuasion burden [in dis-
parate impact cases] must remain with the plaintiff, for it is he who must prove that it
was "because of such individual's race, color," etc., that he was denied a desired
employment opportunity.
Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (citations omitted); see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 997.
11I. For example, after Wards Cove, the Seventh Circuit, in Johnson Controls, relied upon
the pre- Wards Cove decision of the Eighth Circuit in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834
F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), for the principle that:
[A] district court's finding of business necessity itself is persuasive as to the existence
of a bfoq. This court has noted that the analysis of a bfoq "is similar to and overlaps
with the judicially created 'business necessity test.' " The various standards for es-
tablishing business necessity [before Wards Cove] are quite similar to those for deter-
mining a bfoq.
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 894 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (citation omitted) (quoting Chambers, 834 F.2d at 704), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522
(1990); accord Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.8 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
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the burden of proving the requirements under Hayes or Olin, and had merely
to produce evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the fetus through expo-
sure of the excluded sex. Moreover, the defendant-employer did not have to
prove that the harmful environment affected only females and not males;
instead the defendant needed only to show that there was substantial evi-
dence of risk to fertile women. This significant difference relieves the em-
ployer of the bfoq burden to proffer comparative scientific evidence before
sex-based action is taken." 2 Hence, without the burden of proving scientifi-
cally that fetal risk through paternal exposure is insignificant, the employer
may succeed by showing only scientific evidence of fetal harm through ma-
ternal lead exposure. 113
This post- Wards Cove reinterpretation of the business necessity defense
demonstrates the problem of applying the defense in circumstances of overt
discrimination. Title VII states that when an employer discriminates ex-
pressly "because of sex," it violates Title VII "unless sex is a bfoq," with the
consequent burden of persuasion resting with the defendant-employer.
However, when an employer discriminates expressly "because of sex," and a
court applies instead the business necessity defense, the burden of persuasion
improperly rests, at the expense of the statute's language, with the plaintiff.
Accordingly, any similarity between the bfoq and the business necessity
defense should now be recognized only in the type of evidence presented and
the nature of the issues being litigated. The requisite burdens of proof and
the types of Title VII problems addressed with each defense should not be
confused in the fetal protection area. Unfortunately, precisely the opposite
result occurred in Johnson Controls.
III. THE IMPACT OF International Union, UAW V Johnson Controls
In granting a motion for summary judgment for Johnson Controls, the
Seventh Circuit relied upon the conclusions reached within Olin, Hayes, and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)." 4
The court first reasoned that there were no inherent restraints in Title VII
that operated to preclude the defendant from successfully using the business
112. Because of the uncertainty of the scientific evidence, the allocation of the burden
of proof is crucial. An employer will have an extremely difficult time proving the
negative proposition that a one-sex policy is not underinclusive as a matter of science.
In other words, the employer may be able to prove that there are risks to women
workers, but not that there are no similar risks to men workers.
MEDICAL SCREENING, supra note 22, at 54.
113. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 879-83 (considering the overwhelming evi-
dence of risk of harm that lead exposure presents to the fetus and mother, but largely omitting
any discussion of the reproductive effects of paternal lead exposure).
114. Id. at 887.
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necessity defense. Thus, the court adhered to "the necessity of avoiding
rigid application of proof patterns to particular factual situations, ' " espe-
cially those "judicially devised proof patterns in cases that present factual
circumstances different from those encountered previously.,," 6 These flexi-
ble principles, however, were originally announced in a context other than
one of overt, facial discrimination. 17 Thus, however meritorious this flexi-
ble principle is when the critical issue of discrimination has not been reached
and evidentiary burdens need to be allocated in the face of allegations of
discrimination, when faced with an overt, discriminatory policy that ex-
cludes women solely because of their sex, reliance on this principle is mis-
placedg18 because it allows a defendant, using a business necessity defense, to
115. Id. at 883.
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. The Seventh Circuit derived these conclusions from three Supreme Court decisions:
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 883 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990). However, none of these decisions in-
volved an overt discrimination factual situation where the statutory bfoq would apply. See
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580 n.9 (minority applicants denied employment for bricklayer position
and "the general hiring practice, though perhaps legitimate in the abstract, was discriminato-
rily applied in this case"); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-37 (because facially discriminatory pol-
icy not involved, court determined whether there was a pattern or practice of disparate
treatment motivated by prohibited criteria); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-01 (minority
civil rights activist denied employment and alleged discrimination because of civil rights activi-
ties, color, and race). Because of the absence of an overt, discriminatory policy, flexibility in
the allocation of burdens of proof was necessary to determine whether the allegations proved
the ultimate question of discrimination.
118. When the critical issue of discrimination has already been proven, as is the case when
there is direct evidence of discrimination, the necessity for flexibility in presenting the case is
removed. In the age-discrimination context, the Supreme Court has stated simply that "the
McDonnell Douglas [burden shifting] test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct
evidence of discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985);
see also Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1014 (2d Cir. 1980) (When direct
proof of discrimination is available, there is no reason to "adhere stubbornly to [McDonnell
Douglas's] specific formulae when common sense dictates the same result on the basis of alter-
native formulae."), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
Moreover, as stated in United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983):
The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is whether the defendant intentionally dis-
criminated against the plaintiff. In other words, is the employer treating some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. The prima facie case method established in McDonnell-Douglas was never In-
tended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly
way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination. Where the defendant has done everything that would be
required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the
plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant. The district court has before it all the
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escape both a finding of discrimination and a finding of liability. 
19
In deciding Johnson Controls, the Seventh Circuit was "convinced that the
components of the business necessity defense... [,] utilized in fetal protec-
tion cases[,] balance the interests of the employer, the employee and the un-
born child in a manner consistent with Title VII.,' 120 By requiring proof of a
substantial health risk to the unborn child,' 2 ' proof that "the risk of harm to
evidence it needs to decide whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff.
460 U.S. at 715 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied). In Johnson Con-
trols, however, because "[the] case d[id] not concern the order of proof and methods of infer-
ence[, the need for evidentiary flexibility to determine the issue of discrimination was
removed); Johnson expressly use[d] sex to make decisions." 886 F.2d at 911 (Easterbrook &
Flaum, JJ., dissenting). At this stage, the case should merely search for a bfoq and determine
the question of liability. Id. ("When Wisconsin excluded male guards from a women's prison,
we saw this as disparate treatment and searched for a BFOQ.") (citing Torres v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1526-28 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
119. When a finding of employment discrimination has been made, the defendant-employer
may still escape liability for the violation. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989), the Court held:
[When a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that [prohibited criteria] played a moti-
vating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability
only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not taken the [prohibited criteria] into account.
Id. at 1795; see also Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987) (preponderance of
the evidence standard); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 711 (6th Cir. 1985)
(same), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir.
1985) (same); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (same). But see
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 620 (4th Cir.) (clear and convincing evi-
dence standard), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615, 618 (9th
Cir. 1980) (same); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.271(b)(1), (2) (1990) (same). In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), limits the
employer's liability for back pay to two years prior to the date of filing the Equal Employment
Opportunity complaint.
120. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 886.
121. The court stated that requiring proof of substantial harm to the unborn child "effec-
tively distinguishes between the legitimate risk of harm to health and safety which Title VII
permits employers to consider and the 'myths or purely habitual assumptions' that employers
sometimes attempt to impermissibly utilize to support the exclusion of women from employ-
ment opportunities." Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)). The Johnson Controls court held:
The overwhelming medical and scientific research data demonstrating a substantial
risk to the unborn child from lead exposure . . . approaches a "general consensus
within the qualified scientific community," and certainly "suffices to show that
within that community there is a considerable body of opinion that significant risk
exists." Accordingly .... there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to
this component of Johnson Controls' business necessity defense.
886 F.2d at 889 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wright v. Olin, 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir.
1982)).
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offspring be substantially confined to female employees,"' 22 and the absence
of less discriminatory alternatives, 23 the court was "assure[d] that these pol-
icies are only as restrictive as necessary to prevent the serious risk of harm to
the unborn child."'
124
122. Id. at 886. With this requirement met, the court noted that "a fetal protection policy
applying only to women recognizes the basic physical fact of human reproduction, that only
women are capable of bearing children." Id.
In the majority opinion, the court held that UAW failed "to present facts sufficient for the
trier of fact to conclude that transmission of the significant risk of harm lead presents to the
unborn child is not substantially confined to female employees." Id. at 889. In other words,
the UAW did not "present facts sufficient to carry its burden of demonstrating the absence of
the second element of Johnson Controls' business necessity defense, application of the risk of
transmitting lead exposure to unborn children only through females." Id. at 890 (emphasis
supplied). If the bfoq were applied as intended, the defendant-company would bear this bur-
den to show that male exposure to existing lead levels would have no significant effect on their
reproductive system; thereby creating no risk to offspring (and justifying its sex-specific exclu-
sion). Instead, the Seventh Circuit imposed upon the plaintiffs the burden to prove the nega-
tive; i.e., Johnson Controls' argument that lead affected only females was not supported
because male reproductive systems were affected detrimentally.
Johnson Controls' experts, taking "the position that because this data dealt exclusively with
animals, the results of these studies were not scientifically established as being applicable to
humans," "testified that a male worker's exposure to lead at levels ... set forth in OSHA's
[Occupational Safety and Health Administration's] current (1978) lead exposure guidelines did
not pose a substantial risk of genetically transmitted harm from the male to the unborn child."
Id. at 889. However, the court opined that "[tihe UAW's animal research evidence does not
present the type of solid scientific data necessary for a reasonable factfinder to reach a non-
speculative conclusion that a father's exposure to lead presents the same danger to the unborn
child as that resulting from a female employee's exposure to lead." Id. at 889-90 (emphasis
supplied). It is unclear from the opinion whether the Seventh Circuit found that none of the
evidence presented by Johnson Controls relied upon nonhuman scientific data. See id. at 919
(Easterbrook & Flaum, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted) ("The medical profession ... will be
stunned to discover that animal studies are too 'speculative' . . . to be the basis of conclusions
about risks.").
123. Wards Cove makes clear (1) that the UAW bears the burden of presenting specific
economically and technologically feasible alternatives to Johnson Controls' fetal pro-
tection policy; (2) that if the UAW presents such alternatives, the UAW also bears the
burden of demonstrating that its proposed alternative policy is "equally effective as
Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy in achieving Johnson's legitimate employ-
ment goals"; and (3) that this inquiry is to be undertaken with the recognition "that
factors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are
relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective .... " and that
"courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices
Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 892 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). The court held that
the UAW had not met the burden of presenting a genuine issue of material fact at the summary
judgment stage of the litigation because they "failed to present even one specific alternative to
Johnson's fetal protection policy." Id.
124. Id. at 886-87. Underlying these assurances may be the general societal interest in
protecting fetuses or children and the specific employer interest in avoiding possible future
liability for fetal harm to the offspring of workers exposed to lead. See id. at 897 ("[Mlore is at
stake in this case than an individual woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of employ-
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The Seventh Circuit was further convinced125 by the EEOC's findings in
ment... [because a] female's decision to work in a high lead exposure job risks the intellectual
and physical development of the baby she may carry." (citation omitted)); Zuniga v. Kleberg
County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1982) (dictum) ("The economic consequences
of a tort suit brought against the Hospital by a congenitally malformed child could be finan-
cially devastating, seriously disrupting the safe and efficient operation of the business." (cita-
tion omitted)). Similar concerns were expressed by the district court in Johnson Controls: "As
a concern for society and future generations[,] this Court must uphold the fetal protection
policy-" and provide the fetus with "special protection from lead." International Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 316 (E.D. Wis. 1988). "Furthermore, although not
of primary importance, a business should be able to protect itself from future lawsuits which
may arise because a child was prenatally exposed to lead." Id. at 317. But see Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982) (Because the general societal interest in pro-
tecting the health of workers and their offspring is overriding, "it is irrelevant that... the mere
purpose to avoid potential liability and consequent economic loss may not suffice, standing
alone, to establish a business necessity defense." (citation omitted)).
Because the Supreme Court has generally rejected female employee safety concerns of the
employer-defendant in the routine prison context, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335
(1977) ("[Tlhe argument that a particular job is too dangerous for women may appropriately
be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to
make that choice for herself."), and similarly rejected cost concerns in other sex and preg-
nancy-related areas, see Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1085 & n.15
(1983) (retirement benefits); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 685 (1983) (health insurance); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (retirement benefits); see also Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp.,
726 F.2d 1543, 1552-53 n.15 (1 Ith Cir. 1984) ("The employer is, of course, free to protect itself
from financially ruinous lawsuits by purchasing insurance and maintaining the degree of care
required by law."), societal interest and fetal protection concerns should not prevent the appli-
cation of the statutory bfoq defense.
As Judge Posner properly noted:
The [bfoq] defense is applicable to [a] case [of overt discrimination] and[,] although it
is of limited scope[,] it is not the proverbial eye of a needle. In particular, the "nor-
mal operation" of a business encompasses ethical, legal, and business concerns about
the effects of an employer's activities on third parties.
Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 904 (dissenting); cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
1775, 1786 (1989) (The Court has developed an "awareness of Title VII's balance between
employee rights and employer prerogatives."). Hence, the concerns of a business must not
prevent the application of the appropriate statutory defense, in this case the bfoq, cf. TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978) ("It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Con-
gress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated ....");
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709 ("[T]he question of fairness to various classes affected by the statute
is essentially a matter of policy for the legislature to address."), rather, they should be consid-
ered when deciding the sufficiency of Johnson Controls' bfoq defense.
125. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 886. The Court indicated that courts and litigants
may resort to EEOC policy statements for guidance because they are derived from the agency's
experience and expertise. These statements do not, however, have the force of law. Id. at 885.
Although the Seventh Circuit cited this material favorably when discussing the EEOC
guidelines, the court effectively ignored the gender-neutral language, infra, contained in the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) 1978 Lead Standard. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1025 (1990) (Final Standard for Occupational Exposure to Lead); see Johnson Controls,
886 F.2d at 876 n.7, 879 n.13, 880, 882 & n.24.
As the federal agency directed by Congress to regulate workplace health and safety, OSHA's
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its Policy Statement of Reproductive and Fetal Hazards under Title VII.'
26
Although it "candidly recognized that fetal protection policies that 'exclude
only women constitute per se violations of the [Pregnancy Discrimination]
Act,' ,,127 the EEOC, following the Olin-Hayes approach, concluded that the
business necessity defense may apply in fetal protection cases. 28 By follow-
views may also represent a body of experienced and informed judgment deserving of at least
some judicial deference. See United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189,
1257-58 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (When addressing the propriety of a challenge to OSHA's Lead
Standard and the "scientific accuracy of OSHA's studies[,] ... we must defer to the reasonable
and conscientious interpretations of the agency."), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); see also
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(agency's reasonable interpretation given "controlling weight").
The Preamble to the OSHA Lead Standard stated unequivocally:
The record in this rulemaking is clear that male workers may be adversely effected
[sic] by lead as well as women. Male workers may be rendered infertile or impotent,
and both men and women are subject to genetic damage which may affect both the
course and outcome of pregnancy. Given the data in this record, OSHA believes
[that] there is no basis whatsoever for the claim that women of childbearing age
should be excluded from the workplace in order to protect the fetus or the course of
pregnancy. Effective compliance with all aspects of these [sic] standard will mini-
mize risk to all persons and should therefore insure equal employment for both men
and women. There is no evidentiary basis, nor is there anything in this final stan-
dard, which would form the basis for not hiring workers of either sex in the lead
industry.
43 Fed. Reg. 52,966 (1978); see also 43 Fed. Reg. 52,959 (1978) ("Exposure to lead has pro-
foundly adverse effects on the course of reproduction in both males and females."). But see
Thompson, Pinpointing the Risk From Lead: Does Evidence About Effects of Exposure on the
Fetus Warrant Banning Women From Specific Jobs?, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1990, Health, at 8,
col. 4 (Joel Schwartz, a federal Environmental Protection Agency scientist, stated that "[t]he
OSHA standard was set in 1978, and it is woefully inadequate today[;] . . .blood pressure
effects [are seen] at levels much lower than the OSHA standards.").
In light of OSHA's gender-neutral language, the conflicting evidence regarding the level of
safe exposure for both men and women, and the "exclusivity" of female exposure risk raises
doubts about the propriety of granting summary judgment in favor of Johnson Controls on
this issue. See supra note 11.
126. Fetal Hazards, supra note 15, at 6449.
127. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 885-86 (7th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (quoting Fetal Hazards, supra note 15, at 6451 n. 11), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
1522 (1990).
128. Although the BFOQ defense is normally the only one available in cases of overt
discrimination, the Commission follows the lead of every court of appeals to have
addressed the question ... that the business necessity defense applies in these cases.
While business necessity has traditionally been limited to disparate impact cases,
there is an argument that in this narrow class of cases the defense should be flexibly
applied.
Fetal Hazards, supra note 15, at 6451 (footnotes and citations omitted). The EEOC based its
decision upon the theory that fetal protection "cases do not fit neatly into the traditional Title
VII analytical framework and, therefore, must be regarded as a class unto themselves." Id. at
6451 n.ll.
This conclusion is, however, contrary to earlier Proposed Interpretive Guidelines on Em-
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ing the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the EEOC, the Seventh
Circuit found that Title VII recognized women to be solely capable of bear-
ing children12 9 and that Johnson's policy qualified as a business necessity or,
ployment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards issued by the EEOC and the Department
of Labor. 45 Fed. Reg. 7516 (1980), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981). Section 2 of the
Proposed Guidelines provided, in part:
Nondiscriminatory policy to protect employees from reproductive hazards. (a) An
employer/contractor may not have policies, practices or plans designed to protect
employees from reproductive hazards which, by their terms, exclude applicants or
employees from employment opportunities on the basis of sex. Such policies are dis-
criminatory on their face.
(b) An employer/contractor may not disparately treat individual applicants or em-
ployees on the basis of sex. Such treatment constitutes an apparent violation of Title
VII and Executive Order No. 11246, as amended (Executive Order No. 11246).
(c) An employer/contractor may establish a neutral policy, practice or plan to
protect all its employees from reproductive hazards. However, a facially neutral pol-
icy, practice or plan which has an adverse impact on one sex must be justified in
accordance with relevant legal principles.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
In addition, the Explanatory Note, preceding the Proposed Guidelines stated summarily:
[T]he bona fide occupational qualification exception does not apply to the situations
covered by these guidelines. That narrow exception pertains only to situations where
all or substantially all of a protected class is unable to perform the duties of the job in
question. Such cannot be the case in the reproductive hazards setting, where exclu-
sions are based on the premise of danger to the employee or fetus and not on the
ability to perform.
Id.
After the Seventh Circuit's decision in Johnson Controls, the EEOC once again reversed
itself. See Policy Guidance on United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 2 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) 5247, at 6886. The EEOC's inconsistent approach to fetal protection should
have reduced the amount of judicial deference afforded to its pronouncements. Cf Teamsters
v. Daniels, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) ("It is commonplace in our jurisprudence that an
administrative agency's consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which it
operates is entitled to considerable weight;... [b]ut this deference is constrained by our obliga-
tion to honor the clear meaning of a statute .... " (citations omitted)).
129. Although women may be solely responsible for bearing children, men clearly have an
equally important responsibility in procreation. In some cases, exposure of the male reproduc-
tive system to workplace hazards may create the risk of imperfect conception or the risk of
harm to a child, in utero. From a policy perspective, Johnson's fetal protection program may
therefore be underinclusive. See MEDICAL SCREENING, supra note 22, at 53 ("For some ...
agents, such as ionizing radiation, the hazards to men are greater than the hazards to women."
(footnote omitted)).
The human reproductive function is sensitive to chemical exposure in a variety of
ways, ranging from loss of libido, through impotency in men and infertility in both
sexes, to fetal death and structural and functional disorders in offspring. The out-
come with which employers have expressed concern-structural and functional dis-
orders in offspring--can occur through both sexes and in several different ways. The
exposure of the pregnant woman to harmful substances at the work site, is one, but
only one, of the ways in which the fetus may be harmed.
Williams, supra note 23, at 655 (footnote omitted). Some of the numerous examples include:
[Clarcinogens, mutagens, and teratogens are three classes of chemical (e.g., drugs) or
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in the alternative, as a bfoq.
1 31
With the result reached in Johnson Controls, it is increasingly evident
that, by using the Olin-Hayes business necessity defense coupled with the
Watson- Wards Cove reinterpretation, the defendant-employer is faced with a
steadily dwindling evidentiary burden.. in seeking to exclude all fertile wo-
men, pregnant or not, from workplace hazards. Prior to the advent of fetal
protection policies, the business necessity defense never absolved an em-
ployer of Title VII liability for intentional, overt discrimination. 132  Tradi-
tionally, the business necessity defense has been used, and interpreted
physical (e.g., radiation) agents known to disrupt reproductive function. Carcino-
gens are agents which can cause cancer. Carcinogens are capable of acting on cells in
the fetus in a way which leads to cancer in the offspring. Mutagens are agents which
alter the genetic material of cells. Such alteration can lead to cancer or other abnor-
mal cell functioning.... Teratogens are agents which cause malformations in devel-
oping animals.... Toxic exposure of pregnant women on the job may affect fetuses
by: (1) mutagenesis and teratogenesis, (2) exposure to transplacental carcinogenesis
(carcinogens passed from mother to fetus), (3) injury to the fetus due to killing of or
injury to fetal cells, and (4) interference with the essential physiology of pregnancy
leading to abortion, premature delivery, or fetal injury.
Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978
Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IOWA L. REV. 63, 121-
22 (1980) (footnotes omitted). In addition,
[e]xposure of either parent prior to conception to substances that damage the germ
cells is an additional way in which fetuses may be harmed .... Also, the pregnant
woman and, as a consequence, her fetus, can be exposed through a male worker to
toxic substances found in the workplace. One well documented way in which such
exposure occurs is by male transportation of hazardous substances from work to
home on his clothes, shoes .... hair[, or possibly] ... through vaginal absorption of
toxic substances carried in the seminal fluid of the exposed male worker .... More-
over, any particular hazardous substance rarely has just one effect; rather it is likely
to have a range of effects on men, women, and fetuses; and reproductive effects are
likely to be found in men as well as women workers.
Williams, supra note 23, at 656-58 (footnotes omitted); see also MEDICAL SCREENING, supra
note 22, at 53 (occupational toxins with suspected effects on male reproduction include heat,
ionizing radiation, mumps virus, lead, manganese, dibromochloropropane, chlordecone, oral
contraceptives, carbon disulfide, ethylene dibromide, ethylene glycol ethers, and vinyl chlo-
ride) (citing Paul, Reproductive Fitness and Risk, 3 OCCUPATIONAL MED.: STATE OF THE ART
REVS. 323, 329 (1988)).
130. For the Seventh Circuit's discussion of the validity of Johnson's fetal protection policy
as a bfoq, see Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 893-901 (alternative holding).
131. We know from Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio... that the plaintiff bears the
burden of persuasion on all questions in every disparate impact case, as the majority
today emphasizes. So the Wright-Hayes standard has been watered down. The
court's 'adoption' of Wright, Hayes, and the EEOC's policy statement is thus in prac-
tice more favorable to employers than the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits (and the
EEOC) anticipated their approach would be. The plaintiff won in Hayes; she would
lose under the majority's approach.
Id. at 915 (Easterbrook & Flaum, JJ., dissenting).
132. Within Title VII, although there are means to avoid a finding of liability even after
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correctly, to rebut inferential, e.g., statistical, not direct or overt, evidence of
discrimination.
A direct result of the holding in Johnson Controls, "[i]f allowed to stand,
[may be to] encourage employers to begin barring women from certain pro-
duction jobs where toxic chemicals are used."' 133 These positions normally
command the higher paying salaries in industry. 134 Furthermore, an addi-
tional effect of the Seventh Circuit's ruling "might be that more women will
seek to have themselves sterilized in order to survive economically ....
placing doctors in a great moral dilemma." 135
there has been a finding of discrimination, see supra note 119, the bfoq is the only statutorily
prescribed justification for overt discrimination.
133. New Approaches to Safety, Heightened Expectations in Safety and Health Community
as 1990's Open, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, C-i, at C-16 (Jan. 11, 1990) [hereinafter New
Approaches] (subsection entitled Reproductive Hazards). "According to attorney Joan Bertin
of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project, many employers already
exclude women from certain jobs due to reproductive hazards, and that the practice is not
confined to small employers but includes Fortune 500 companies." Id. Additionally,
Maureen Paul, an obstetrician-gynecologist associated with the University of Massa-
chusetts's Occupational Health Program, told BNA that a Massachusetts study in-
volving more than 200 employers showed that 20 percent of the companies had some
type of practice that excluded women from certain jobs. Only one company had a
policy that excluded men ....
Id. Ms. Paul stated that if Johnson Controls is upheld, the largely "invisible" policies exclud-
ing females might "come out of the closet." Id.
134. Id. Professor Mary E. Becker, of the University of Chicago Law School, felt that "the
majority opinion [in Johnson Controls] effectively 'excludes whole categories of higher-paying
union jobs from [gender] integration.' " Samborn, Worker Safety: 7th Circuit Bias Ruling Criti-
cized, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 30, col. 2.
135. New Approaches, supra note 133, at C-16.
Similarly, excluding all women of child-bearing capacity is probably overinclusive.
Where the toxin or other hazard presents an unreasonable risk to the fetus in the first
few weeks of development, employers may be concerned about accidental
pregnancies. Yet less than nine percent of all fertile working women are pregnant in
any given year; for blue collar women over 30, the birth rate may be less than two
percent, and only 1 in 5000 women between the ages of 45 and 49 has a child in a
given year. Moreover, even some fertile women, for a variety of reasons including
celibacy, sexual orientation, or relations with a non-fertile male, are at little or no
risk of becoming pregnant. More importantly, in the past few years the technology
of early pregnancy testing has advanced to the point that, through regular testing,
pregnancy could be detected almost immediately. Employers' fears of concealed
pregnancies could, in some instances, be eliminated by adopting a policy of transfers
to a non-hazardous area with no reduction in pay or seniority. Whether the em-
ployer can reasonably adopt a less exclusionary policy must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. Of course, a conclusion that a policy is overbroad does not necessarily
invalidate the entire policy if it is [otherwise] valid, but does so only to the extent of
its overbreadth.
Fetal Hazards, supra note 15, at n.16 (citations omitted).
One dissenting opinion in Johnson Controls agreed in saying:
[I]t is clear that defendant's fetal protection policy is excessively cautious in two
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To prevent these effects when addressing overt gender-based fetal protec-
tion in the future, the employer must retain the burden of proving the
bfoq t 36 when deliberately excluding fertile women because of their sex. By
requiring this, courts will adhere to the language and goals of Title VII and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 137 Hence, employers will be forced to
regards: first in presuming that any woman under the age of 70 is fertile, and second
in excluding a presumptively fertile woman from any job from which she might ulti-
mately be promoted into battery making, even if her present job does not expose her
to lead.
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 907 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
136. Indeed, this result may be guided by the plain meaning of the language in Title VII,
the PDA, and the bfoq. Requiring the statutory application of the bfoq to gender-based fetal
protection policies may therefore be beyond serious doubt. See Board of Governors v. Dimen-
sion Fin., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) ("If the statute is clear and unambiguous 'that is the end of
the matter .. ' " (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984))); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) ("When we find
the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in 'rare and excep-
tional circumstances.' " (citation omitted)); North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312
(1983) ("As with any case involving statutory interpretation, 'we state once again the obvious
when we note that, in determining the scope of a statute, one is to look first at its language.'"
(quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983)) (citation omitted));
Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 480 (1981) ("As in every case involving the interpretation of a
statute, analysis must begin with the language employed by Congress." (citation omitted));
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("[T]he starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself [and a]bsent a clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as con-
clusive."); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once the meaning of an enactment is
discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end."); 2A
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).
The result intended by Congress, application of the bfoq defense, will not, however, neces-
sarily sound the death knell for all fetal protection policies. The employer still has the oppor-
tunity to satisfy the bfoq, maintaining the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout. In
addition, employers may structure facially neutral fetal protection policies that exclude, rotate,
or grant mandatory leave to both males and females at risk from workplace hazards.
137. These mandates have recently been vindicated in Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908
F.2d 1303, 1310-11 (6th Cir. 1990),and Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 551, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 176-77 (1990).
In Grant, a female employee brought suit alleging that her reassignment (according to the
General Motors Corp. (GM) fetal protection policy) from a foundry area, which contained
levels of airborne lead, violated Title VII. The GM policy, similar in many respects to that of
Johnson Controls, mandated the exclusion of female employees from areas containing exces-
sive airborne lead levels, and included mandatory bi-monthly blood testing and the use of
respirators. Grant, 908 F.2d at 1305. The policy, in all respects, applied only to female em-
ployees. Id.
After canvassing the Wright, Hayes, and Johnson Controls decisions, the Sixth Circuit va-
cated the district court's grant of summary judgment to GM:
[Fletal protection policies perforce amount to overt sex discrimination, which cannot
logically be recast as disparate impact and cannot be countenanced without proof
that infertility is a BFOQ. To hold otherwise would be to usurp congressional power
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
satisfy the bfoq or adopt facially neutral exclusionary policies. Facially neu-
tral policies, developed after testing for the deleterious effects of workplace
toxins on both sexes, may exclude predominately one sex, depending on the
nature of the toxin. This result, however, will treat employees equally and
to regulate pregnancy discrimination on the basis of public policy. Our task is one of
interpretation, not legislation.
Id. at 1310 (citation omitted).
The state court, under California law, held that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy,
identical to the one upheld in Johnson Controls, could not be justified under either the business
necessity or bfoq defense. The court concluded:
By excluding all women solely on the basis of fertility, the Company makes at least
the following unfounded assumptions about women-none of which has anything
whatsoever to do with "objective differences" between men and women: (1) that all
unmarried fertile women are either presently actively involved in sexual relationships
with men, or will definitely become so involved; (2) that fertile women who are ac-
tively involved in sexual relationships with men or who may become so involved, are
or will be involved with a fertile man (a woman's partner, for example, might have
had a vasectomy); (3) that fertile women who are actively involved in sexual relation-
ships with a fertile man, or will become so, cannot be trusted to employ reasonably
adequate prophylactic measures against an unexpected pregnancy; and (4) that fertile
women, even when possessed of sufficient information about the worksite hazard, are
incapable of properly weighing the chances of unexpected pregnancy, notwithstand-
ing use of prophylactic measures, against the possibility of fetal hazard should she
become pregnant.
Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (emphasis in original) (foot-
note omitted).
Accompanying the above text, the court stated:
We would suggest that women may or may not want children, may or may not be
bound by an oath to strict chastity, or may or may not have sexual preferences that
do not include males or the possibility of pregnancy. We are in an era of choice. A
woman is not required to be a Victorian brood mare. She may, with constitutional
basis, prefer not to have children. Had the job seeker in this case been a fertile nun,
the Company's purported justification for excluding her from the job-fetal protec-
tion-would manifestly be far from persuasive. Such an example points to this con-
clusion. The Company's concern would be less with biological differences and more
with the possibility [that] the woman would violate her vow of celibacy.
Id. at 551 n.16, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 177 n.15 (emphasis in original).
The Company's policy is predicated upon the presumption that the employer is
better suited to safeguard the interests of a woman's future offspring, should there be
an unexpected pregnancy, than is the woman herself-i.e., that society's interest in
fetal safety is best served, not by fully informing women of the risks involved and
allowing them to make informed choices, not by fixing the workplace, but rather by
removing from women the opportunity to make any choices in the matter at all.
Distilled to its essence, this is not discrimination based on "objective differences"
between men and women, it is discrimination based on categorical, long ago dis-
carded assumptions about the ability of women to make . . . reasoned, informed
choices.
However laudable the concern by businesses such as the Company for the safety of
the unborn, they may not effectuate their goals in that regard at the expense of a
woman's ability to obtain work for which she is otherwise qualified.
Id. at 551-52, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78 (footnote omitted).
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will be based upon the company's specific evidence of the toxin's effects on
both sexes. Only then should the employer have the relative luxury of pro-
ducing a cognizable business necessity defense.
When faced with a facially neutral fetal protection policy, the plaintiff
may be able to rebut evidence of a business necessity by proving the availa-
bility of alternative measures that are equally as protective and/or cost-effec-
tive, remaining consistent with the decision in Wards Cove. As a result of
this burden, employers have an incentive to adopt facially neutral practices
and examine the effects of hazardous workplace environments on both sexes;
thereby adhering more closely to their professed goal of workplace safety, a
goal which should be applied neutrally and in the interests of all employees.
If, and when, male workers find that dangerous chemicals significantly affect
both male and female reproductive systems, employers, fearing inadequate
labor supply, may have a more forceful economic incentive to develop the




Under Title VII, the touchstone of any fetal protection policy should be
facial neutrality. By characterizing a facially discriminatory policy as a
facially neutral policy, and consequently applying the business necessity de-
fense, the court in Johnson Controls confused the application of Title VII
defenses. Like every other area of Title VII, the employer should be forced
to make business decisions with an even hand. Therefore, a court should
apply the strict bfoq requirement to facially discriminatory policies. Em-
ployers may then be forced to structure their policies toward exclusion of
any worker, male or female, whose offspring or reproductive capacities are
jeopardized by exposure to a dangerous workplace environment. This re-
quirement may encourage employers to establish testing procedures that are
not skewed solely to determine the effects of workplace hazards on fertile
women.
In the end, the results of testing for a facially neutral fetal protection pol-
icy may well show that fertile and/or pregnant women pose the most serious
risk to the employer's legitimate business goal of workplace safety. This re-
sult will, however, be predicated on an even-handed approach to the vulner-
ability of both sexes in the workplace. Most importantly, this approach will
avoid the potential for overinclusiveness (excluding qualified women who are
138. As Judge Coffey noted, "if ever a lead-free battery were developed, the problems in
this case would fall by the wayside. We hope that this is achieved tomorrow." Johnson Con-
trols, 886 F.2d at 901 n.43.
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not at risk, or women who have no plans to procreate) and underinclusive-
ness (failing to exclude men who, along with their families, are at risk).
Patrick T Clendenen

